Zambian 2013 Budget Reviewed by Kampamba Shula

On 12 October 2012, the Minister of Finance, Hon. Alexander Bwalya Chikwanda, MP, announced the 2013 National Budget. Budget highlights and taxation and other changes as contained in the Budget speech and the Zambia Revenue Authority (“ZRA”) publication.

INDECO (IDC): Past Problems and Opportunities Analysed by Kampamba Shula

INDECO (IDC): Past Problems and Opportunities Analysed

Critical Review of IMF 2013 Zambia ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION report by Kampamba Shula

Debt management is still on track The agreed norm is that for internal borrowing the threshold is 25 per cent of GDP but our debt stands at K17 billion, which is 15 per cent of GDP and for external borrowing, the threshold is 40 per cent and our debt is US$3.1 billion which is 14 per cent of GDP, so we are far below the agreed norms. So even in the long term , Zambia is still on track.

US Economy 2014 First Quarter Analysis and Outlook by Kampamba Shula

New data shows the U.S. economy contracted in the first quarter of this year, keeping pace with shifting expectations but down sharply from the prior already disappointing estimate.

Zambia Debt Analysis

Some might say that Zambia should not borrow externally and even as sincere as they may be they are wrong. When the Government borrows locally “Crowing out” happens.

Tuesday, October 30, 2012

The Zambian Mining Industry Reviewed by Kampamba Shula


The Zambian Mining Industry
Zambia plays an important role in the global copper mining industry. The country contains the largest known reserves of copper in Africa, holding 6 percent of known copper reserves in the world. The history of Zambia’s copper mining industry is one of decline followed by revival. From around 700,000 tonnes in the 1970s, copper production fell to just 255,000 tonnes in 1998 as nationalization of the mines proved counter-productive. However, since the mines were privatized in the 2000s, investment and output have revived, and Zambia is regaining its world market share. In addition, the industry is expanding geographically from its traditional base in the Copperbelt to other parts of the country, where geological surveys suggest significant deposits of copper.
Copper plays a critical role in Zambia’s economy. Historically, the performance of the Zambian economy has followed the fortunes of copper mining closely. Although the economy is diversifying, copper mining continues to account for a sizeable part of GDP and is one of the lead industries for economic growth. However, Zambia—as a country—could benefit more from the mining industry. All countries that depend on natural resources face the shared challenge of taxation: determining tax levels and administering tax revenues in an effective manner that balances the needs of Government and investors. Mining depletes a valuable natural asset and taxing the mining companies is a way of generating savings that can be redeployed to increase the productive capacity of the rest of the economy, and thereby help sustain the country over the long-term. Despite the revival of the industry post-privatization, the mining industry’s contribution to government revenues in Zambia has remained low. The industry accounts for 15-18 percent of GDP and exports over US$3 billion worth of copper per year, but contributes just 8 percent of total tax revenue.

The reason for the low tax-take lies in the Development Agreements that were signed by Government and the mines at the time of privatization and that gave away generous tax concessions. By early 2007, concerns about ‘resource robbery’ caused by the low tax-take were creating a public outcry, which led the Government to impose, in 2008, a new tax regime consisting of higher royalties and taxes, including a windfall tax. Many aspects of the new regime, including the windfall tax, were ultimately reversed in response to the fall in copper prices during the global financial crisis. In 2009, the Government instituted another new tax regime with an effective tax rate (47 percent) within the international range (40-50 percent). This regime was designed to increase the level of government revenues, as mines that were rehabilitated after privatization began to generate strong, positive cash flows. The new tax regime, however, was challenged by the mining industry, which argued that the invariability clauses in the original Development Agreements precluded such changes. It is worth noting that a country’s legal/regulatory environment is a key determinant for investors when they compare the attributes of different destination countries. Exploration and mining companies seek a stable, predictable and transparent regulatory environment in which the rules of the game are clearly set out and administered on an equitable basis. These characteristics are particularly important in the case of the mining industry, given the high upfront capital investment and long payback periods involved. In late-2010 the Government reached an agreement with a number of mines, and these mines have already started paying in accordance with the new regime. Negotiations continue with a few remaining mines in order to bring them into the fold of the new regime. Due to its significant footprint and the debate over its tax contributions to the country, the mining industry has remained the focus of economic and political attention in Zambia.

Industry Structure

Many of the firms involved in Zambia’s copper mining are the subsidiaries of small- to medium-sized firms (by international standards of mining companies). However, there are notable exceptions (such as Vedanta, Glencore, and the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Group) that are major global players. Reports suggest that these are also likely to be joined by BHP Billiton, the world’s largest mining house. Though Zambian copper mining essentially is a private industry, the Government has retained a sizeable holding of the shares of the privatized mines.

The global copper mining industry operates with a long-term perspective, and production costs and risk are critical issues. The nature of the industry requires high upfront investment, high risk and long payback periods, and this has a number of implications (see below). Production costs can differ significantly between mines, depending on the type of mine and nature of the deposit. In the mining and refining industries, with prices determined by international markets, the key determinants of competitiveness are the costs of production and transporting product to market. A mine’s cost of production is a function of the nature of the resource (the quality of the ore, its depth, etc.) and the extent to which the most accessible resources have been exploited. The depletion of resources at the older mines means that they now need to mine at considerable depth and distance from the mine head, leading to high costs. Younger mines can save on operating costs, but they have to bear the upfront investment in capital and equipment, which can be significant. In addition, the cost and productivity of inputs influence the cost of production at all mines, irrespective of the nature of the resource. If prices are reasonably attractive, the cost of inputs low and the productivity of inputs high, even older mines can earn profits. For transport costs, location relative to processing and refining facilities is the key driver of costs. The overall business environment in which the mine operates also affects costs.

Potential for Zambia

Zambia is recognized internationally as having good mineral potential. The Fraser Institute’s highly respected survey of mining and exploration companies ranks Zambia 26th out of 79 jurisdictions worldwide for mineral potential. In Africa, only the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burkina Faso have an appreciably higher score for mineral potential. The resources available to existing mines in Zambia are estimated at 2.8 billion tonnes of ore ranging between 0.6 percent and 4 percent copper. This, together with recent successful exploration, should be sufficient to sustain even an expanded industry well into the middle of the twenty-first century. Global demand for copper is expected to remain strong. Long-term forecasts are by nature uncertain, but global demand for copper is expected to grow at around 3 percent annually, reaching 25 million tonnes by 2020. Much of the increase in demand will be driven by economic growth and urbanization in emerging economies, especially China and India. Limited global supply should support high (but volatile) prices and continued investment. Global supply of copper from known sources is expected to peak at 20 million tonnes by 2013/14 and decline thereafter, resulting in a shortfall in supply. As a result, copper prices are expected to remain high in real terms, though they will be subject to cyclical fluctuations and periodic, short-term volatility. To meet the shortfall in supply and to take advantage of high prices, the global mining industry is looking to increase investment in copper mining and refining. Good mineral potential, combined with strong demand in the global market, provide an excellent opportunity for growth in Zambia’s copper mining industry. Assuming other conditions are right (e.g. Zambia’s mines are competitive in terms of costs and productivity levels), Zambia can capitalize on its mineral potential as well as the strong demand for copper in the global market.

Cost Structure

Production costs are high, driven by high (and rising) input costs and low productivity. The Zambian mining industry has a high cost base. Nearly all operations in Zambia are in the top half of the international cost curve (see Figure below). Many of the older mines, which account for the majority of output, are in the upper quartile of the cost curve. The newer mines have lower costs but are still in the middle of the curve. The major input cost of concern is labor, which has risen dramatically in recent years and the productivity of which is well below international standards. The cost of other inputs, such as equipment, spares, fuel and other consumables is also high.

Poor infrastructure is a major constraint on competitiveness. Electric power shortages limit output and existing generating capacity is insufficient to keep pace with any significant expansion in the mining industry. The rail system is costly and unreliable. Clearing borders is slow and costly, and this compounds unnecessarily high transport costs. Zambia’s policy environment is not considered favorable. The Fraser Institute’s 2010/11 survey ranked Zambia 57th out of 79 jurisdictions in terms of policy environment. This is confirmed by the influential mining consultant Behre Dolbear which, in its 2011 report, ranked Zambia 19th out of 25 countries in terms of attractiveness to mining investment. Given the significant upfront capital investments and the long payback period inherent in the industry, the stability of the regulatory environment—in relation to taxation in particular—is crucial, and Zambia scored only 3 out of 10 on the tax regime component of the Behre Dolbear Index.

Exploration
Better availability and quality of geological survey information could facilitate new mining investment. With as much as 40 percent of the country remaining to be surveyed, it is impossible to state with precision the size and economic potential of additional copper reserves in Zambia. Without high quality and detailed survey data upon which to base exploration decisions, potential investors face greater uncertainty and must proceed on a speculative basis. Investor uncertainty is ultimately reflected in the price they are willing to pay for a license, compromising Zambia’s ability to get appropriate value for money from exploration licenses. While some data are available, the quality and level of specificity is often not sufficient to support exploration. In addition, information is often not easy to access from abroad. Higher quality and more easily available survey data are likely to attract more investment and lead to development agreements that deliver better outcomes for the Government, the mines, and the Zambian people.

The cost of electric power from the public grid in Zambia (US$0.04-0.06 per kWh) is among the lowest in the world. Periodic outages, however, are a concern for power-intensive industries like mining and refining due to the sometimes lengthy disruptions to production. Should the country again suffer frequent electric power outages as it did in 2008, mines would have to rely on a combination of grid power and costly standby diesel generation (US$0.32-0.40 per kWh), making the cost of electric power uncompetitive compared to countries with reliable supply from the grid. Even more important is the capacity of the grid to accommodate planned growth in production. Without a 40 percent or more increase in supply, availability of electricity may be the binding constraint on whether and when the industry reaches the 1 million tonne target. Assuming a constant intensity of electric power demand, the target of 1 million tonnes is likely to be achievable only when the Kafue Gorge Lower project comes on-stream in 2016. In addition, as the industry expands to new parts of the country, there is a need to extend the grid.

Greater labor productivity could improve cost competitiveness. Low labor productivity is driven, on the one hand, by increasing labor costs and, on the other, by low output per worker. For example, at Mopani, labor costs increased almost fourfold between 2003 and 2008, and now comprise just over 40 percent of costs, compared with 22 percent at Indonesia’s Grasberg mine. This is despite the fact that mining is not a labor-intensive industry. Adversarial wage bargaining and Government and social pressure has encouraged large wage increases for “insiders” (trade union members) at the expense of restricting employment opportunities for the large number of unemployed Zambians (“outsiders”).

Labor productivity is a larger concern, and in this regard Zambia lags well behind international standards. In Chile, annual production of copper per worker is almost seven times greater than in Zambia, and a difference of this magnitude cannot be explained solely by variables like scale, nature of resources and better equipment. Low productivity is in large part driven by gaps in workers’ skills that are rooted in weak technical and vocational training from industry and training institutions.

More competitive, locally-produced goods and services could reduce mines’ supply costs. Manufactured goods, equipment and consumables are expensive and/or difficult to obtain in Zambia; hence mines rely heavily on imports from South Africa and elsewhere. Due to the logistics costs, trade facilitation fees and markups associated with imports, equipment and spare parts in Zambia can cost more than twice what they would in other countries. Motivated by profit, mines are keen to source from the least-cost providers that can meet their standards of quality, quantity and reliability. The greater use of local manufacturers could theoretically reduce the import and logistics-related costs that mines currently incur. Local manufacturers, however, lack the capacity to deliver the more complex, high value- added products that account for the majority of mines’ spending at a sufficient quality to meet the needs of the mines. International mine suppliers, who can produce the required quality, have thus far not located in Zambia due to its lack of attractiveness for manufacturing and, until recently, insufficient demand from mines. As a result, the industry buys only low-value items (such as food, clothing, and non-critical services) locally, often from traders rather than local manufacturers. Developing a high-quality, high-value-added manufacturing base in Zambia that is capable of supplying reliably a number of key products to the mines, will take time and will likely not be feasible for all types of mine supplies. Nevertheless, a more efficient local manufacturing industry could ultimately reduce input costs for the mines, improve industry competitiveness over the longer term, raise the incomes of local producers, and, potentially, help create markets for the copper fabrication industry.

Transport

Almost all of Zambia’s copper is ultimately exported, exiting Zambia along the routes of the North-South Corridor which connects the Copperbelt province with the major ports of Durban in South Africa (2,600 km) and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania (1,800 km). Due to the weight and volume of copper and, in many cases, long transport distances to port, rail—which tends to be lower cost than road transport—is the preferred mode of transport in the copper industry worldwide. In Zambia, however, the railway that links the Copperbelt to Dar es Salaam and Durban commands a very limited market share. Privatization has not brought the investment and skills needed to revive a rail system that fell into disrepair under public ownership, and the system has not been extended to new mining areas. In contrast, the trucking companies that, in the absence of an effective rail system, carry the vast majority of Zambian copper to market, are relatively price competitive despite significant inefficiencies along the corridor. Trucking companies interviewed during the course of this study charge around 4.2 cents/tkm for southbound traffic from the Copperbelt to Durban and 6.7 cents/tkm for northbound traffic. The southbound price compares favorably with many other African transport corridors and countries such as China and France (5.0 cents/tkm). However, the trucking of copper does face a number of challenges that unnecessarily increase costs and transit times. Aside from inefficiencies related to border crossings (described below) the main inefficiencies in the logistics environment are related to high fuel prices, poor conditions on some road stretches, and the risk of theft of cargo.

Regulatory Environment

A new regulatory and tax regime that balanced the interests of the industry and the country could create a ‘win-win’ situation. At the root of the disagreements over the tax regime is the inability of the Government and industry to find an equitable balance between, on the one hand, the commercial interests of the industry and, on the other, the industry’s contribution to national prosperity. Such a regime needs to cover, in a clear and transparent fashion, taxation, as well as Government’s obligations to provide the macro stability, governance, infrastructure and social services that the industry needs to prosper. In exchange, the Government and public at large need assurances that the mines are in fact contributing sufficient tax revenues to support the communities within which they operate and at levels consistent with profits they receive from extracting Zambia’s natural resources. Unless such a regime is agreed upon, the industry will continue to dispute at least some aspects of the new tax regime and the growth of government revenues will be constrained. Moreover, the regime will remain unstable, thereby undermining investor confidence. A more predictable regulatory environment could increase stability and reduce risks for investors. Given the large upfront investments, long-term commitments and long investment payback horizons inherent in the mining industry, stable and predictable policies are essential in evaluating a mining project’s perceived risks and economic viability. Frequent legal and regulatory changes create an air of uncertainty for investors. Zambia’s recent history of regulatory changes (such as has been seen in relation to taxation, as discussed earlier) is a severe constraint on both new investment as well as the continued operation of established mines. Responsibility for the delivery of social services could be transferred to the Government and supported by appropriate tax contributions from mines. In Zambia, expectations for the social contribution of mines extend well beyond those typically borne by private industry. Zambian mining companies incur costs and responsibilities associated with operating schools, hospitals and clinics, and maintaining local road infrastructure. Mines serve these roles partly due to gaps in government provision but in large part due to legacy expectations of mines that developed prior to privatization. While in financial terms these costs are relatively minor, uncertainty and lack of clarity under the current arrangement is cited as a key deterrent to greater investment in the sector. Hence, there may be a need for a more explicit agreement with the Government and the public at large on an appropriate allocation of social provision responsibilities, with the Government taking greater responsibility for supplying the services and a shared understanding that the industry contributes its part through the tax revenues it provides to the Government. Such an understanding would have to be supported by mechanisms to ensure appropriate tax compliance and payment by industry.

References

F. McMahon and M. Cervantes for The Fraser Institute. April 2010. Survey of Mining Companies 2009/10.

Michael Engman. May 2010. The Role of Trade and Transport Issues in the Competitiveness of Zambia’s Copper Industry (draft)).

 

 

Thursday, October 25, 2012

Zambian 2013 Budget Reviewed by Kampamba Shula


Zambia Budget Review

On 12 October 2012, the Minister of Finance, Hon. Alexander Bwalya Chikwanda, MP, announced the 2013 National Budget. Budget highlights and taxation and other changes as contained in the Budget speech and the Zambia Revenue Authority (“ZRA”) publication.

The Government plans to spend K32.2 trillion to be financed by:

·         K24.7 trillion (77 percent) from domestic revenues;

·          K5.9 billion (18 percent) from domestic and foreign borrowings; and

·          K1.5 billion (5 percent) grants from cooperating partners.

Macroeconomic targets for 2013 are to:

·         Achieve real GDP growth of above 7 percent;

·         Attain end-year inflation of no more than 6 percent;

·         Achieve domestic revenue of at least 20 percent of GDP;

·         Limit overall fiscal deficit to 4.3 percent of GDP, of which domestic borrowing will be 1.3 percent;

·         Maintain gross international reserves of at least 4 months of import cover; and

 

Utilization of US$750 million Eurobond Proceeds

The Minister has proposed to apply:

·         US$430 million, 57.3 percent of the Eurobond proceeds, towards road and rail transport projects;

·         US$255 million (34 percent) on energy generation and transmission projections; and of

·         The balance of US$65m going to fund central hospitals, SMEs and transaction and funding costs.


Tax Incentives and Loopholes in Customs and excise duty

·         Remove customs duty on importation of :

(a) Engines of all types;

(b) Cranes of all types;

(c) Conveyor belts;

(d) Machines for cutting, grinding, polishing, drilling and welding;

(e) Vacuum and liquid pumps; and

(f) Sprayers of all types.

·         Remove customs duty on importation of the following:

(a) Automatic data processing machines;

(b) Magnetic or optical readers; and

(c) Machines for transcribing and processing data.

·         Remove the 15 percent customs duty on importation of ambulances in a move aimed at increasing access to health care services.

·         Remove the 15 percent customs duty on importation of motor cycles. Motor cycles play an important role in supporting access by rural health and agriculture extension workers to areas not accessible by other means of transport.

·         Increase customs duty from zero percent to 15 percent on flat rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel excluding those coated with tin and lead used in the manufacture of roofing sheets.

·         Remove excise duty on carbonated drinks and packed water in a measure intended to stimulate growth of the beverage sector.

·         Remove customs duty on locomotives, carriages and rail traffic control equipment for railways to encourage investment in the railways sector.

·         Suspend duty on articles and equipment for sports, games and general physical exercise for a period of 3 years to 31 December 2016.

·         Suspend customs duty on the following goods up to 31 December, 2013 effect from midnight on 12 October, 2012:

(a) New motor vehicles for tourism enterprises that offer transport services;

(b) New articles and equipment for furnishing and refurbishment of accommodation and catering

facilities for businesses licensed as tourism enterprises.

·         Remove customs duty on new and re-treaded pneumatic tyres intended to reduce the cost of doing business

Sectors

Agriculture
 

The agriculture sector is expected to contribute one half of the new employment opportunities over the next five years, making it one of the priority sectors. The Country has continued to record bumper harvests in crop production. However, this has mostly been concentrated in maize production, which has been the focus of the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP). In order to boost and diversify crop production, Government intends to:

·         Include other crops in the FISP such as soya, cotton, sunflower and rice;

·         Streamline the electronic voucher system from 2013 in order to strengthen the private sector’s role in supplying agriculture inputs;

·         Scale up investment in extension services, irrigation, training institutions and research and development in order to improve crop yields.

Key initiatives in 2013 will include:

·          Promotion of increased local production of key inputs such as fertilizer and seeds;

·          Incentives to encourage local value

·          Restriction of the operations of the Food Reserve Agency to management of strategic food reserves only.

·         The Government has increased the budget allocation to this sector from K1,698 billion in 2012 to K1,865.4 billion.K1.1 trillion for the core agriculture programmes, including those aimed at promoting the sector’s diversification and cater for livestock, fisheries, crops and irrigation development;

·         an amount of K500 billion (2012: K500 billion) for the reformed FISP; and

·         K300 billion (2012: K300 billion) for the purchase of strategic food reserves.

Mining

The sector performance has been weaker than expected against a backdrop of a lethargic global economy leading to depressed copper prices and reduced copper export volumes during the year. To improve monitoring and mining systems the Government will aim to:

·         Building capacity at the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Development to facilitate the monitoring of both quality and quantity of mineral production and exports; and

·         Strengthening the regulatory and penal system with regard to false reporting of production and export volumes.

Tourism

The Sector has been identified as key in diversification of the economy. Accordingly, the Government intends to promote and expand tourism products and develop key infrastructure with the planned move to make Choma the provincial capital for Southern Province, it is expected that resources in Livingstone will be devoted to enhancing its status as the tourist capital. A total of K21.1 billion has been allocated

to the Tourism Sector compared to K12.8 billion in 2010 towards marketing activities. In order to leverage the maximum benefit from hosting the 2013 United Nations World Tourism Organisation Conference, Government proposes to suspend duty up to 31 December 2013 on the following goods:

·         New motor vehicles for tourism enterprises that offer transport services; and

·         New articles and equipment needed to furnish or refurbish accommodation and catering facilities for businesses licensed as tourism enterprises.

 Government aims to facilitate creation of 300,000 jobs in the tourism sector over the next 5 years.

Manufacturing

The Government’s primary strategic objective is to enhance the competitiveness of locally manufactured products, in both the local and export market by:

·         Promoting value addition to locally available raw materials; and

·         Implementing targeted investment incentives for entrepreneurs involved in value addition ventures.

The Government proposes to eliminate the following duties:

·         Customs duty on engines and cranes of all types, conveyor belts, machines for cutting, grinding, polishing, drilling and welding, vacuum and liquid pumps and sprayers of all types;

·          Excise duty on carbonated drinks and packed water; and

·         Customs duty on locomotives, carriages and rail traffic control equipment to reduce transportation costs for bulky products.

The Government has made a specific K255 billion budgetary allocation for the rehabilitation of the Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia. The Government anticipates that some 90,000 jobs will be generated over the next five years as a result of these interventions.

Energy

The sector faces a number of challenges including frequent disruptions of power supply.

In collaboration with the private sector, the Government intends to:

·         Increase installed generation capacity;

·         Improve the transmission and distribution infrastructure; and

·         Expand rural access to electricity.

To this end, the Government is working with the private sector with regard to the:

·         Development of the Itezhi – Tezhi and Kafue Gorge lower power stations; and

·         Completion of the extension of the Kariba North Bank Power Station, amongst others. The petroleum sub-sector continues to be of key focus with the Government pledging to:

·         Continue with the construction of fuel depots across the country; coupled with the

·         Promotion of the use of renewable energy and alternative sources of energy such as solar, bio-mass, geo-thermal and wind.

In support of the above initiatives as the Government proposes to allocate:

·         K984.3 billion for electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure; and

·         K336.3 billion for the rural electrification programme.

The Government expects approximately 90,000 jobs to be created on account of these interventions.

Transport and Communication

The Government has reaffirmed its commitment to reduce the cost of doing business through, among others, transport infrastructure improvement. Government’s objective is to ensure that all provincial capitals and rural areas have accessibility to markets.

The following key initiatives have been undertaken by the Government:

·         Link Zambia 8,000 project to result in over 8,000km of a road network over a five year period K billion has been allocated over three phases

·         2,000 km of township roads to be paved using labour- initiative and environmental friendly technology

·         Termination of concession agreement of the Railway Systems of Zambia and Government proposes to allocate K642.6 billion to revamp the sector.

·         US$430 million of the Eurobond proceeds have been allocated to road and rail transport

Monetary and Financial

Despite unfavorable global economic conditions Government believes performance of the domestic economy has been satisfactory. Government monetary policy targets to stay this course and:

·         Achieve real GDP growth of above 7 percent;

·         Achieve year end inflation of no more than 6 percent;

·         Achieve domestic revenue of at least 20 percent of GDP;

·         Limit the overall fiscal deficit to 4.3 percent of GDP, of which domestic borrowing will be 1.5 percent;

·         Maintain gross international reserves of at least four months of import cover; and

·         Maintain a flexible foreign exchange climate that espouses limited Bank of Zambia interventions to curb volatility. Other notable decisions undertaken in 2012 to facilitate Government macroeconomic policy implementation in 2013 are as follows:

·         Rebase the Zambian Kwacha from January 2013 for the purpose of simplifying financial transactions;

·         Increase commercial bank’s minimum aggregate capital from the current ZK12 billion to ZK104 billion for locally owned banks and to ZK520 billion for foreign owned banks. This is intended to enhance commercial banks’ capacity and promote the financial services sector;

·          Introduction of a policy rate to signal the Bank of Zambia’s monetary policy stance and to provide financial markets with a credible and stable anchor for setting of interest rates;

·         Removal of tax on interest earned by individuals from savings and deposit accounts;

·          Removal of medical levy currently charged on interest earned on savings and deposit accounts, treasury bills, government bonds and other similar financial instruments;

·          Statutory requirement for all local transactions to be effected in Zambian Kwacha; and

·          Statutory guidelines to address large disparities between buying and selling foreign exchange rates levied by authorized foreign exchange dealers.

Health

A total of K3.6 trillion representing 11.3% of the total budget has been allocated towards the health sector. This is 40.% over the 2012 allocation. The focus in the health sector has been highlighted as follows:

·         Improving service delivery especially in rural areas;

·         Scaling up of the provision of essential drugs and medical equipment and other supplies; and

·         Upgrading all hospitals commencing with the three referral hospitals.

Empowerment Funds

K103.9 billion has been allocated for the purpose of empowerment of entrepreneurs, with women and the youth the primary focus. This compares with K40 billion allocated in 2012

Happy 48th Independence Zambia!!

 
Economeka and its affiliates would like to wish Zambia a Happy 48th Independence.

Monday, October 22, 2012

Euro Debt Crisis : Greece Reviewed by Kampamba Shula



The Euro Debt Crisis
The European sovereign debt crisis is a current financial crisis that has made it difficult for some countries in the euro region to repay or refinance their government debt without help from third parties. The structure of the Eurozone as a monetary union (i.e. one currency) without fiscal union (e.g. different tax and pension rules) added to the crisis and harmed the ability of European leaders to respond.
Greece
In the early mid-2000s, Greece’s economy was one of the fastest growing on the Eurozone and was associated with a large structural deficit. As the world was hit by the global financial crisis in the late 2000s, Greece was hit especially hard because its main industries which are shipping and tourism were especially sensitive to changes in the business cycle. The government spent heavily to keep the economy functioning and the country’s debt increased accordingly.

The Origin of Greece’s Euro Debt crisis
Its starting point can be traced at the onset of the USA sub-prime crisis in the summer of 2007. Starting from a value of 25 basis points (b.p.), the spread of the 10-year Greek government bond yield against the German bund entered a moderately ascending path reaching 65 b.p. in August 2008. A second, much more intense, phase followed between September 2008 and March 2009. This marked the peak of the global credit crunch crisis, by the end of which the Greek spread had reached 285 b.p. Similar developments were observed in the rest of the EMU periphery countries; it was clear, however, that markets were distinguishing against Greek and Irish bonds. A brief period of de-escalation, between April and August 2009, coinciding with the partial easing of the global crisis, followed.

Nevertheless, although in August 2009 the Greek spread declined to 121 b.p., it was clear that, relative to other periphery EMU countries, markets continued to have Greek and Irish bonds on their bad books.

Greek Fundamentals

In the first-generation crisis model proposed by Paul Krugman (1979) the speculative attack against a currency peg is the deterministic outcome of an unsustainable fiscal expansion pursued by a myopic government and financed by excessive money creation depleting foreign currency reserves. When reserves fall below a critical threshold, rational agents, in anticipation of the peg’s future collapse, buy the government’s remaining reserves forcing an immediate devaluation. This restores the exchange rate to a value consistent with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

This story’s basic premise, i.e. unsustainable fiscal policy, is clearly present in the case of Greece. Also, since EMU accession in 2001 the country has experienced consistently higher inflation than the EMU average, resulting in substantial deviation from PPP, pronounced competitiveness losses and record current account deficits (see Arghyrou and Chortareas, 2008). Overall, there is little doubt that Greek fundamentals have deteriorated enough to justify a first-generation attack had Greece run a currency of its own.

But when compared to the collapse of a conventional peg, debt default is a much rarer and therefore much less likely event, particularly for a Eurozone member with additional access to IMF emergency cash. So, although the deterioration of Greek fundamentals plays a key role in current events, the crisis’ escalation in November 2009 is unlikely to have been caused by market fears of an imminent Greek debt default.

The proposed budget submitted to the EU in mid-November 2010 was a game changer, as it shifted the balance of expectations from credible to no credible commitment, putting Greece from the flat to the steep loss function (L2). This explains the steep increase in Greek bond spreads observed in mid- November/December 2009 in the absence of further negative news on fundamentals.

If the analysis above is correct, what we have observed in November 2009 was the mutation of a challenging crisis of deteriorating fundamentals into a full blown crisis of confidence in the Greek monetary regime. This explains the failure of the announced EU/IMF rescue plan to relieve the pressure on Greek spreads. The plan failed to do so because the Greek spread was not only driven by an increasing risk of default (to be fully explained below) but also increasingly strong expectations that Greece cannot bear, or is not willing to bear, the cost of reforms necessary to stay in the euro. In other words, the markets worry that Greece will eventually opt for a voluntary exit from the EMU causing Greek bond holders capital losses through currency devaluation.

Events then moved as follows: In the absence of an effective EU-sponsored mechanism of fiscal monitoring and imposing reform, Greek governments over 2001- 2009 did not implement sound economic policies, thus allowing further deterioration of fundamentals.

Current Events

On 23 April 2010, the Greek government requested an initial loan of 45 billion Euros from the EU and International Monetary Fund to cover its financial needs for the remaining part of 2010.A few days later Standard & Poor’s slashed Greece’s sovereign debt rating to BB+ or junk status, in which case investors where liable to lose 30=50% of their money.

On 1 May 2010, the Greek government announced a series of austerity measures to secure a three year 110 billion loan. This was met with massive protests and social unrest throughout Greece. The Troika (EU,ECB and IMF), offered Greece a second bailout loan worth 130 billion Euros in October 2011, but with the activation being conditional on implementation of further austerity measures and a debt restructure agreement.

All the implemented austerity measures, have so far helped Greece bring down its primary deficit - i.e. fiscal deficit before interest payments - from €24.7bn (10.6% of GDP) in 2009 to just €5.2bn (2.4% of GDP) in 2011, but as a side-effect they also contributed to a worsening of the Greek recession, which began in October 2008 and only became worse in 2010 and 2011.The austerity relies primarily on tax increases which harms the private sector and economy. Overall the Greek GDP had its worst decline in 2011 with −6.9%, a year where the seasonal adjusted industrial output ended 28.4% lower than in 2005, and with 111,000 Greek companies going bankrupt (27% higher than in 2010).As a result, the seasonal adjusted unemployment rate also grew from 7.5% in September 2008 to a record high of 19.9% in November 2011, while the Youth unemployment rate during the same time rose from 22.0% to as high as 48.1%.

Some economic experts argue that the best option for Greece and the rest of the EU, would be to engineer an “orderly default”, allowing Athens to withdraw simultaneously from the Eurozone and reintroduce its national currency the drachma at a rebased rate.

However, if Greece were to leave the euro, the economic and political consequences would be devastating. According to Japanese financial company Nomura an exit would lead to a 60% devaluation of the new drachma. Analysts at French bank BNP Paribas added that the fallout from a Greek exit would wipe 20% off Greece's GDP, increase Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio to over 200%, and send inflation soaring to 40%-50%.Also UBS warned of hyperinflation, a bank run and even "military coups and possible civil war that could afflict a departing country". Eurozone National Central Banks (NCBs) may lose up to €100bn in debt claims against the Greek national bank through the ECB's TARGET2 system. The Deutsche Bundesbank alone may have to write off €27bn.

To prevent all this from happening, the troika (EU, IMF and ECB) eventually agreed in February 2012 to provide a second bailout package worth €130 billion, conditional on the implementation of another harsh austerity package, reducing the Greek spending with €3.3bn in 2012 and another €10bn in 2013 and 2014.[93] For the first time, the bailout deal also included a debt restructure agreement with the private holders of Greek government bonds (banks, insurers and investment funds), to "voluntarily" accept a bond swap with a 53.5% nominal write-off, partly in short-term EFSF notes, partly in new Greek bonds with lower interest rates and the maturity prolonged to 11–30 years (independently of the previous maturity).

On 9 March 2012 the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) issued a communique calling the debt restructuring deal with its private sector involvement (PSI) a "Restructuring Credit Event" which will trigger payment of credit default swaps. According to Forbes magazine Greece’s restructuring represents a default. It is the world's biggest debt restructuring deal ever done, affecting some €206 billion of Greek government bonds. The debt write-off had a size of €107 billion, and caused the Greek debt level to fall from roughly €350bn to €240bn in March 2012, with the predicted debt burden now showing a more sustainable size equal to 117% of GDP by 2020, somewhat lower than the target of 120.5% initially outlined in the signed Memorandum with the Troika.

Critics such as the director of LSE's Hellenic Observatory argue that the billions of taxpayer euros are not saving Greece but financial institutions, as "more than 80 percent of the rescue package is going to creditors—that is to say, to banks outside of Greece and to the ECB. The shift in liabilities from European banks to European taxpayers has been staggering.

 One study found that the public debt of Greece to foreign governments, including debt to the EU/IMF loan facility and debt through the euro system, increased from €47.8bn to €180.5bn (+132,7bn) between January 2010 and September 2011, while the combined exposure of foreign banks to (public and private) Greek entities was reduced from well over €200bn in 2009 to around €80bn (-120bn) by mid-February 2012.

Economeka Recomendations by Kampamba Shula
The restructuring of Greek economy based on austerity alone is bound to fail unless it is inclusive of viable growth targets.Greece can not leave the Euro, the effects of such a move would be fatal to Greece and the periphery countries like Italy,Spain,Portugal.Time needs to be given to Greece for these reforms to be part of strategy that the Greek people believe is inclusive of Growth.This will in turn translate to business confidence which will help change investor perspective on Greek Bonds and bring yields down.

References

"Crisis in Euro-zone—Next Phase of Global Economic Turmoil". Competition master date =. Retrieved 24 February 2012.

Michael G. Arghyrou, J. D. (2010). THE GREEK DEBT CRISIS: LIKELY CAUSES, MECHANICS AND OUTCOMES. Cardiff: Cardiff University.