The European sovereign debt crisis is a current financial crisis that has made it difficult for some countries in the euro region to repay or refinance their government debt without help from third parties. The structure of the Eurozone as a monetary union (i.e. one currency) without fiscal union (e.g. different tax and pension rules) added to the crisis and harmed the ability of European leaders to respond.
Greece
In the early mid-2000s, Greece’s economy was one of the fastest growing on the Eurozone and was associated with a large structural deficit. As the world was hit by the global financial crisis in the late 2000s, Greece was hit especially hard because its main industries which are shipping and tourism were especially sensitive to changes in the business cycle. The government spent heavily to keep the economy functioning and the country’s debt increased accordingly.
Nevertheless, although in August 2009 the Greek spread
declined to 121 b.p., it was clear that, relative to other periphery EMU countries,
markets continued to have Greek and Irish bonds on their bad books.
Greek
Fundamentals
In the first-generation crisis model proposed by Paul
Krugman (1979) the speculative attack against a currency peg is the
deterministic outcome of an unsustainable fiscal expansion pursued by a myopic
government and financed by excessive money creation depleting foreign currency
reserves. When reserves fall below a critical threshold, rational agents, in
anticipation of the peg’s future collapse, buy the government’s remaining
reserves forcing an immediate devaluation. This restores the exchange rate to a
value consistent with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).
This story’s basic premise, i.e. unsustainable fiscal
policy, is clearly present in the case of Greece. Also, since EMU accession in
2001 the country has experienced consistently higher inflation than the EMU
average, resulting in substantial deviation from PPP, pronounced
competitiveness losses and record current account deficits (see Arghyrou and
Chortareas, 2008). Overall, there is little doubt that Greek fundamentals have
deteriorated enough to justify a first-generation attack had Greece run a
currency of its own.
But when compared to the collapse of a conventional
peg, debt default is a much rarer and therefore much less likely event, particularly
for a Eurozone member with additional access to IMF emergency cash. So,
although the deterioration of Greek fundamentals plays a key role in current events,
the crisis’ escalation in November 2009 is unlikely to have been caused by
market fears of an imminent Greek debt default.
The proposed budget submitted to the EU in
mid-November 2010 was a game changer, as it shifted the balance of expectations
from credible to no credible commitment, putting Greece from the flat to the
steep loss function (L2). This explains the steep increase in Greek bond
spreads observed in mid- November/December 2009 in the absence of further
negative news on fundamentals.
If the analysis above is correct, what we have
observed in November 2009 was the mutation of a challenging crisis of
deteriorating fundamentals into a full blown crisis of confidence in the Greek
monetary regime. This explains the failure of the announced EU/IMF rescue plan
to relieve the pressure on Greek spreads. The plan failed to do so because the
Greek spread was not only driven by an increasing risk of default (to be fully
explained below) but also increasingly strong expectations that Greece cannot
bear, or is not willing to bear, the cost of reforms necessary to stay in the
euro. In other words, the markets worry that Greece will eventually opt for a voluntary
exit from the EMU causing Greek bond holders capital losses through currency
devaluation.
Events then moved as follows: In the absence of an
effective EU-sponsored mechanism of fiscal monitoring and imposing reform,
Greek governments over 2001- 2009 did not implement sound economic policies,
thus allowing further deterioration of fundamentals.
Current
Events
On 23 April 2010, the Greek government requested an initial
loan of 45 billion Euros from the EU and International Monetary Fund to cover
its financial needs for the remaining part of 2010.A few days later Standard
& Poor’s slashed Greece’s sovereign debt rating to BB+ or junk status, in
which case investors where liable to lose 30=50% of their money.
On 1 May 2010, the Greek government announced a series
of austerity measures to secure a three year 110 billion loan. This was met
with massive protests and social unrest throughout Greece. The Troika (EU,ECB
and IMF), offered Greece a second bailout loan worth 130 billion Euros in
October 2011, but with the activation being conditional on implementation of
further austerity measures and a debt restructure agreement.
All the implemented austerity measures, have so far
helped Greece bring down its primary deficit - i.e. fiscal deficit before
interest payments - from €24.7bn (10.6% of GDP) in 2009 to just €5.2bn (2.4% of
GDP) in 2011, but as a side-effect they also contributed to a worsening of the
Greek recession, which began in October 2008 and only became worse in 2010 and
2011.The austerity relies primarily on tax increases which harms the private
sector and economy. Overall the Greek GDP had its worst decline in 2011 with
−6.9%, a year where the seasonal adjusted industrial output ended 28.4% lower
than in 2005, and with 111,000 Greek companies going bankrupt (27% higher than
in 2010).As a result, the seasonal adjusted unemployment rate also grew from
7.5% in September 2008 to a record high of 19.9% in November 2011, while the
Youth unemployment rate during the same time rose from 22.0% to as high as
48.1%.
Some economic experts argue that the best option for
Greece and the rest of the EU, would be to engineer an “orderly default”,
allowing Athens to withdraw simultaneously from the Eurozone and reintroduce
its national currency the drachma at a rebased rate.
However, if Greece were to leave the euro, the
economic and political consequences would be devastating. According to Japanese
financial company Nomura an exit would lead to a 60% devaluation of the new
drachma. Analysts at French bank BNP Paribas added that the fallout from a
Greek exit would wipe 20% off Greece's GDP, increase Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio
to over 200%, and send inflation soaring to 40%-50%.Also UBS warned of
hyperinflation, a bank run and even "military coups and possible civil war
that could afflict a departing country". Eurozone National Central Banks
(NCBs) may lose up to €100bn in debt claims against the Greek national bank
through the ECB's TARGET2 system. The Deutsche Bundesbank alone may have to
write off €27bn.
To prevent all this from happening, the troika (EU,
IMF and ECB) eventually agreed in February 2012 to provide a second bailout package
worth €130 billion, conditional on the implementation of another harsh
austerity package, reducing the Greek spending with €3.3bn in 2012 and another
€10bn in 2013 and 2014.[93] For the first time, the bailout deal also included
a debt restructure agreement with the private holders of Greek government bonds
(banks, insurers and investment funds), to "voluntarily" accept a
bond swap with a 53.5% nominal write-off, partly in short-term EFSF notes,
partly in new Greek bonds with lower interest rates and the maturity prolonged
to 11–30 years (independently of the previous maturity).
On 9 March 2012 the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA) issued a communique calling the debt
restructuring deal with its private sector involvement (PSI) a
"Restructuring Credit Event" which will trigger payment of credit
default swaps. According to Forbes magazine Greece’s restructuring represents a
default. It is the world's biggest debt restructuring deal ever done, affecting
some €206 billion of Greek government bonds. The debt write-off had a size of
€107 billion, and caused the Greek debt level to fall from roughly €350bn to
€240bn in March 2012, with the predicted debt burden now showing a more
sustainable size equal to 117% of GDP by 2020, somewhat lower than the target
of 120.5% initially outlined in the signed Memorandum with the Troika.
Critics such as the director of LSE's Hellenic
Observatory argue that the billions of taxpayer euros are not saving Greece but
financial institutions, as "more than 80 percent of the rescue package is
going to creditors—that is to say, to banks outside of Greece and to the ECB. The
shift in liabilities from European banks to European taxpayers has been
staggering.
One study found
that the public debt of Greece to foreign governments, including debt to the
EU/IMF loan facility and debt through the euro system, increased from €47.8bn
to €180.5bn (+132,7bn) between January 2010 and September 2011, while the
combined exposure of foreign banks to (public and private) Greek entities was
reduced from well over €200bn in 2009 to around €80bn (-120bn) by mid-February
2012.
Economeka Recomendations by Kampamba Shula
The restructuring of Greek economy based on austerity alone is bound to fail unless it is inclusive of viable growth targets.Greece can not leave the Euro, the effects of such a move would be fatal to Greece and the periphery countries like Italy,Spain,Portugal.Time needs to be given to Greece for these reforms to be part of strategy that the Greek people believe is inclusive of Growth.This will in turn translate to business confidence which will help change investor perspective on Greek Bonds and bring yields down.
References
The restructuring of Greek economy based on austerity alone is bound to fail unless it is inclusive of viable growth targets.Greece can not leave the Euro, the effects of such a move would be fatal to Greece and the periphery countries like Italy,Spain,Portugal.Time needs to be given to Greece for these reforms to be part of strategy that the Greek people believe is inclusive of Growth.This will in turn translate to business confidence which will help change investor perspective on Greek Bonds and bring yields down.
References
"Crisis
in Euro-zone—Next Phase of Global Economic Turmoil". Competition master
date =. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
Michael G. Arghyrou, J. D. (2010). THE GREEK DEBT
CRISIS: LIKELY CAUSES, MECHANICS AND OUTCOMES. Cardiff: Cardiff
University.
0 comments:
Post a Comment