In monetarist theory, deflation must be associated with
either a reduction in the money supply, a reduction in the velocity of money or
an increase in the number of transactions. But any of these may occur
separately without deflation. It may be attributed to a dramatic contraction of
the money supply, or to adherence to a gold standard or other external monetary
base requirement.
However, deflation is
the natural condition of hard currency economies when the supply of money is
not increased as much as positive population growth and economic growth. When
this happens, the available amount of hard currency per person falls, in effect
making money more scarce; and consequently, the purchasing power of each unit
of currency increases. Deflation occurs when improvements in production
efficiency lower the overall price of goods. Competition in the marketplace
often prompts those producers to apply at least some portion of these cost
savings into reducing the asking price for their goods. When this happens, consumers
pay less for those goods; and consequently deflation has occurred, since
purchasing power has increased.
The effects of deflation are:
1.Decreasing nominal
prices for goods and services
2.Increasing buying
power of cash money and all assets denominated in cash terms
3.May decrease
investment and lending if cash holdings are seen as preferable (aka hoarding)
4.Benefits recipients
of fixed incomes
During severe deflation, targeting an interest rate (the
usual method of determining how much money to create) may be ineffective,
because even lowering the short-term interest rate to zero may result in a real
interest rate which is too high to attract credit-worthy borrowers. Thus the
central bank must directly set a target for the quantity of money (called
"quantitative easing") and may use extraordinary methods to increase
the supply of money, e.g. purchasing financial assets of a type not usually used
by the central bank as reserves (such as mortgage backed securities). Before he
was Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke claimed in
2002, "...sufficient injections of money will ultimately always reverse a
deflation", although Japan's deflationary spiral was not broken by this
very sort of quantitative easing.
JAPAN
Deflation started in the early 1990s. The Bank of Japan and
the government tried to eliminate it by reducing interest rates and
'quantitative easing', but did not create a sustained increase in broad money
and deflation persisted. In July 2006, the zero-rate policy was ended.
Systemic reasons for
deflation in Japan can be said to include:
JAPAN, one of the great exporting nations, usually runs a
trade deficit with, of all places, Switzerland. Why? Ask Rolex. Japan also buys
more from France and Italy than it sells there. Why? Bordeaux, Brie, mascarpone
and Armani, to name a few expensive vices. In Japan such delicacies are mostly
immune to deflation, while prices of everyday goods like cars, electronic goods
and clothes tumble. Why then do Japanese firms continue to churn out the
latter, even though margins are low? And could this help explain Japan's
persistent deflation problem?
These questions preoccupy Kosuke Motani, author of “The Real
Face of Deflation”. In this book's first seven months in print, 500,000 copies
have been sold, including one to Naoto Kan, the prime minister. Mr Motani
argues that deflation in Japan is not so much a monetary problem as a
structural one linked to bad business decisions and demography.
Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso said the government is
imitating his Depression-era predecessor, Korekiyo Takahashi, who told the Bank
of Japan (8301) to underwrite government debt to fund deficit spending.
“There is no one in the government, the bureaucracy or the
BOJ who has experience in anti-deflation policy,” Aso said yesterday in an
interview on NHK television. “We can only learn from history,” he said, adding
that the new administration is looking to Takahashi’s example
As finance minister in 1932, Takahashi increased fiscal
spending by 34 percent, doubled bond issuance and instructed the BOJ to
underwrite government debt, according to a report by the Japan Center for
Economic Research. While the effort helped end deflation and boost growth, Takahashi
made enemies in the military when he later attempted to rein in spending. He
was assassinated in 1936.
Takahashi “brilliantly rescued Japan from the Great
Depression through reflationary policies,” Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S.
Bernanke said in a speech in 2003. His policy package increased the fiscal
deficit, depreciated the currency and expanded the money stock, with robust
growth and mild inflation for the five years from 1933, according to a research
paper co-authored by Masato Shizume, an economist working for the BOJ.
“If a central bank starts to underwrite government bonds,
there may be no problems at first, but it would lead to a limitless expansion
of currency issuance, spur sharp inflation and yield a big blow to people’s
lives” and the economy, as has happened in the past, BOJ Governor Masaaki
Shirakawa said in 2011. The central bank took the step in the 1930s because the
debt market was “very immature,” Shirakawa said.
Under Takahashi’s initiative, the BOJ’s underwriting
continued for 14 years until the end of World War II, with the ratio of bonds
bought by the central bank peaking in 1933 at 89.6 percent, according to a 2001
paper by the central bank.
Now, the BOJ purchases government bonds through the
secondary market, and includes the securities in its 76-trillion yen
asset-purchase program.
Since taking office in December, Abe’s government has
announced fiscal stimulus to boost an economy in recession, with the BOJ
agreeing to a 2 percent inflation target requested by the government and
announcing open-ended asset purchases in a bid to stop more than a decade of
falling prices.
Aso told lawmakers in Parliament today that the government
will try to maintain trust in its fiscal management.
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